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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The two appeals involving Crossroads present two basic
issues.

The first issue is whether the district court properly

granted summary judgment on Rasmussen's claim for breach of an
alleged oral lease agreement.

That issue involves

consideration of the following:
1.

Whether the plaintiff Rasmussen alleged

facts sufficient to invoke the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as a bar to application of the statute of
frauds?
2.

Whether there are sufficient memoranda of

the alleged oral agreement, subscribed by Crossroads,
to satisfy the statute of frauds?

3.

Whether any of the acts alleged by plaintiff

Rasmussen constituted part performance of the alleged
oral lease agreement?
The issue presented by the second appeal is whether
the district court erred in rejecting plaintiff's attempt to
raise fraud as an affirmative defense to Crossroad's
counterclaim for unpaid rent under a written lease.

That issue

involves consideration of the following:
1.

Whether the duty to plead an affirmative

defense is satisfied by an answer filed nearly one
year after it became due?
2.

Whether Rasmussen waived his claim of fraud

by occupying the leased space and accepting the
benefits of the lease for nearly five years before
asserting his claim?
3.

Whether the statute of limitations applies

when fraud is asserted as a defense?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The Utah statute of frauds is dispositive of
Rasmussen1s claims for breach of an alleged oral lease
agreement.

The applicable provisions state:

No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting,

assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1984).
Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
Ld. § 25-5-3.
The rules of civil procedure requiring that
affirmative defenses be set forth in a timely responsive
pleading are dispositive of the appeal from summary judgment on
Crossroads1 counterclaim.

The applicable provisions state:

In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by
fellow servant, laches, license, payment,
release, res judicata, statute of frauds statute
of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense. When a party has mistakenly designated
a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as
a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there
had been a proper designation.
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days
after the service of the summons is complete
(unless the court directs otherwise, as provided
by Rule 65B), unless otherwise expressly provided
by statute or order of the court. A party served
with a pleading stating a cross-claim against him
shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days
after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall

serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer
within 20 days after service of the answer or, if
a reply is ordered by the court, within 20 days
after service of the order, unless the order
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as
follows, unless a different time is fixed by
order of the court: (1) if the court denies the
motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading
shall be served within 10 days after notice of
the court's action; (2) if the court grants a
motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within 10
days the service of the more definite statement.
Rule 12(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that
the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the defense of
failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to
a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if
one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter,
the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the
light of any evidence that may have been received.
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The statute of limitations applicable to claims based
on fraud is also dispositive of the appeal from summary
judgment on the counterclaim.
Within three years.--

(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud
or mistake; but the cause of action in such case

shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (1977).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Rasmussen has appealed from three separate
judgments on two unrelated claims.

The first appeal concerns

Rasmussen1s claim that both Deseret Federal and Crossroads
breached an alleged oral agreement requiring Deseret Federal to
release certain space on Level One of the Crossroads Mall to
Crossroads in order for Crossroads to lease the same space to
Rasmussen.

On December 10, 1984, District Judge Sawaya entered

summary judgment in favor of Deseret Federal on the grounds
that enforcement of the alleged oral agreement was barred by
the statute of frauds.

Crossroads thereafter moved for summary

judgment on the grounds that Crossroads could not possibly be
required to lease space to Rasmussen that Deseret Federal would
not relinquish.

Crossroads1 motion was granted on January 7,

1985.
The second appeal relates to Crossroads1 counterclaim
for rents due from Rasmussen pursuant to a separate lease of
separate space on Level Two of the Crossroads Mall which
Rasmussen occupied from November, 1980, until the day he
abandoned the premises immediately after the entry of summary
judgment in favor of Crossroads on May 20, 1985.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Alleged Agreement For Lease of Deseret
Federal's Level One Space.

In July of 1982, Rasmussen contacted Bruce Barcal
regarding the possibility of taking over certain space on Level
One of the Crossroads Mall then occupied by Deseret Federal.
R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 19). Barcal was a leasing agent
employed by Kravco, Inc. which manages the Crossroads Mall for
the owner. Crossroads.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 12, p. 2).

Rasmussen informed Barcal that Deseret Federal had "tentatively
agreed" to release the space in question, subject to
Crossroads1 permission, in order for Crossroads to lease the
space to Rasmussen.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 19). Barcal

indicated that he needed permission from Crossroads before
negotiations could proceed.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 20-21).

At a second meeting in July, Barcal indicated that
Crossroads had given permission for Rasmussen to proceed with
his negotiations with Deseret Federal.
25).

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo.

At that time Rasmussen understood that Barcal was simply

a "negotiating lease agent" and that "whatever documents were
generated would have to be approved by the owner."

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. 26).
Subsequent to the July, 1982 meetings, Barcal informed
Rasmussen that the negotiations for space on Level One would
not proceed unless Rasmussen paid certain construction costs
(approximately $2,400) relating to Rasmussen1s space on Level

Two of the Crossroads Mall.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 26-27).

Rasmussen testified by way of sworn affidavit that he was told
"that Crossroads would negotiate for a lease of new space (then
occupied by Deseret Federal) only if affiant paid the disputed
construction charges."

R. 239, If 3.

Rasmussen paid the

disputed construction costs over a six-month period between
August of 1982 and January of 1983.

R. 157.

By letter dated December 30, 1982, Barcal informed
Deseret Federal that he was "very close to putting together a
transaction" and requested Deseret Federal's "corporate
approval to proceed with the lease negotiation."

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 11). Deseret Federal supplied a copy of
the letter to Rasmussen R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 29-30).
Rasmussen understood the letter to refer to a prospective
tenant other than Rasmussen and he expressed to Barcal his
displeasure with Barcal "circumventing" their "negotiation".
R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 30). Rasmussen also told Barcal "that
he should contact Deseret Federal because that is the nature of
the negotiation, that they had intended to lease to none other
but Vaughn Rasmussen1s. Inc."

Id.

In a subsequent meeting in January, 1983, Rasmussen
reiterated his and Deseret Federal's position that "we had been
negotiating all these many months and unless there was an
agreement with Deseret Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen1s to take

over that space that there was no agreement."

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. 32).
Deseret Federals position and conditions for an
agreement were set forth in a letter, dated January 13, 1983,
that Rasmussen brought to the January meeting.

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. 35, Depo. Ex. 2). The letter recited that
Deseret Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen "had been negotiating a
proposal" and purported to give Barcal "the authority necessary
to manage the proposal" upon certain conditions, including the
execution of additional agreements between Deseret Federal and
Rasmussen.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 2). The conditional

authority would expire on March 15, 1983.

T&.

The tentative,

nonbinding nature of the proposal was reiterated by Deseret
Federal's statement that "If for any reason Vaughn Rasmussen
should choose to discontinue his plans to occupy the subject
space, Deseret Federal is not interested in any further
proposals."

Ld.

Rasmussen later testified that the letter was

consistent with the negotiations that had taken place up to
that time.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 75-76).

Rasmussen claims that Barcal promised on numerous
occasions that the necessary lease documents would be sent by
Kravco, Inc., and that on two separate occasions in February,
1983, Barcal promised that the documents would be delivered to
Rasmussen by a certain date.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 45-46).

On March 9, 1983, Rasmussen addressed a letter to Barcal

stating that he had to have the leases by March 11. 1982 in
order to meet the deadline imposed by Deseret Federal.

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 3). Rasmussen threatened legal action
against Barcal and Kravco. Inc. (but not Crossroads) if the
"deal fails due to lack of follow-through either by you or
Kravco."

Ld.

negligent.

Rasmussen testified that he felt Barcal had been

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 46).

On the same date, March 9, 1983, Barcal addressed a
letter to Deseret Federal which stated that Crossroads intended
to release Deseret Federal from the space in question and lease
it to Rasmussen.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 4). The letter

advised that Kravco. Inc. was providing lease forms which "you
should be receiving. . . in approximately five (5) business
days."

Id.
Prior to Deseret Federal's unilaterally imposed

deadline of March 15. 1983, Deseret Federal informed Rasmussen
that it did not want to release the space and began negotiating
a sublease with Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 48. 63).
Deseret Federal requested Crossroads1 consent to the sublease
on March 23. 1983.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 5). Crossroads

was opposed to the sublease proposal but was still willing to
pursue the original proposal.

Thus, despite Deseret Federal's

and Rasmussen1s change of plans. Kravco. Inc. proceeded to
prepare the promised lease and lease surrender forms and
delivered those to Rasmussen on April 13. 1983.

R. 175

(Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 8). The documents provided by Kravco,
Inc. were never executed by either Deseret Federal or
Rasmussen.

R. 129, 1f 4.

Similarly, the "additional

agreements" between Rasmussen and Deseret Federal which Deseret
Federal required to be executed by March 15, 1983, were never
executed.

Id.
Rasmussen contends that he incurred several expenses

in reliance on the alleged promises of Deseret Federal and
Crossroads.
II.

Crossroads1 Counterclaim For Rents Due On
Rasmussen1s Space On Mall Level Two.

In May of 1980, Vaughn Rasmussen entered into a lease
for space on Level Two of the Crossroads Mall which was then
under construction.

R. 239, If 3.

The Crossroads Mall was

completed and opened in August of 1980.

R. 175 (Rasmussen

Depo. 19). Prior to the opening of the Mall, Rasmussen
determined that he would not be prepared to open his shoe store
when the Mall opened and requested that the rent be abated
until the shoe store opened for business.

R. 175 (Rasmussen

Depo. 17). Crossroads agreed to the abatement of rent and
Rasmussen opened for business in late October or early November
of 1980.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 18). Rasmussen continued to

occupy the Level II space at least until the time of
Crossroads1 motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim.
R. 226.
On May 25, 1984, Crossroads filed its counterclaim

against Rasmussen, alleging that Rasmussen had failed to make
his monthly rental payments for November. 1983 and all
subseguent months.

R. 74.

At his deposition on July 5. 1984, Rasmussen admitted
that he was behind in his rent payments and that the rent was
owed to Crossroads.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 73-74).

At no

time during the deposition did Rasmussen suggest that the lease
for the Level Two space was unenforceable or affected by fraud
in any way.
On March 28, 1985, Crossroads moved for summary
judgment on its counterclaim.

R. 176-78.

motion was set for April 15, 1985.
was later re-set for May 6, 1985.

The hearing on the

R. 227-229.
R. 230-232.

The hearing
On May 1, 1985,

just two business days before the hearing and more than 11
months after Rasmussen1s answer to the counterclaim was due,
Rasmussen1s counsel mailed an answer to the counterclaim,
together with an affidavit, asserting that Rasmussen was not
obligated to pay rent because of an alleged misrepresentation
made prior to May of 1980.

R. 234-242.

The alleged

misrepresentation was that Crossroads1 leasing agent indicated
an intent to construct a walkway across Main Street between the
second levels of the Crossroads Mall and the ZCMI Mall.
239-240.

R.

No such walkway was ever built on any level of the

Crossroads Mall.
District Judge Sawaya granted summary judgment on the

counterclaim ruling that Crossroads' affidavit stating the
amounts owing was uncontroverted and that Rasmussen's "claimed
defenses will not lie."

R. 244.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court properly granted summary judgment
on Rasmussen's claim against Crossroads for breach of an
alleged oral lease agreement.

The correspondence between the

parties and the testimony of Vaughn Rasmussen show that no
lease agreement was ever entered into.

The lengthy

negotiations involving three principals and one agent required
a coordination of acts which never occurred and, as a result,
the proposed deal fell through.
Even if the Court accepts all of Rasmussen1s
contentions (that Crossroads promised to execute a written
lease agreement and that Rasmussen acted to his detriment in
reliance on Crossroads' promise), those alleged facts are not
sufficient to prevent the application of the statute of
frauds.

Nor are the facts alleged by Rasmussen sufficient to

satisfy the statute of frauds either by sufficient memoranda or
part performance.
Summary judgment on Crossroads' counterclaim was also
proper.

Rasmussen's failure to allege fraud as a defense until

nearly a year had passed since the filing of Crossroads'
counterclaim constituted a waiver of the defense.

That

Rasmussen had proceeded to occupy his leased space and

continued to occupy the space for more than four and one-half
years after the alleged fraud occurred and that he occupied the
space for more than 18 months without paying any rent before he
ever suggested that he would claim fraud as a defense also
constituted a waiver of the fraud claim.

Because the statute

of limitations had run on Rasmussen's fraud claim before
Crossroad's claim for rent had accrued, the assertion of fraud
as a defense was also time-barred.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary
Judgment On Rasmussen's Claims Against
Crossroads For Breach Of The Alleged Oral
Lease Agreement.

Appellant Rasmussen concedes that the alleged oral
lease agreement between Deseret Federal, Rasmussen and
Crossroads comes within the Utah statute of frauds which
reguires that leases for a term exceeding one year must be in
writing and must be subscribed by the party assigning or
surrendering the leasehold interest.
§25-5-1 (1984).

Utah Code Annotated,

Rasmussen asserts however that both Crossroads

and Deseret Federal are barred from asserting the statute of
frauds as a defense by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Rasmussen further asserts that there are sufficient written
memoranda and sufficient acts of part performance to satisfy
the reguirements of the statute of frauds.

The facts of record

in this case, however, interpreted in the light most favorable
to Rasmussen, create no genuine issue of material fact

sufficient to support any of Rasmussen's theories.
The brief of Deseret Federal correctly sets forth the
applicable law regarding each of Rasmussen1s theories and
Crossroads adopts by reference the arguments of Deseret
Federal.

The application of law to the particular facts

involving Crossroads is set forth below.
A.

There Is No Basis For Rasmussen1s Claim
of Promissory Estoppel.

Rasmussen contends that Crossroads should be estopped
from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense because its
leasing agent, Kravco, Inc., allegedly promised to provide
lease and lease release forms to Rasmussen on various
occasions.

Rasmussen contends that he relied on the promises

of Kravco, Inc., when he obtained an SBA loan, incurred various
expenses relating to the improvements of the space to be
leased, and paid disputed construction costs relating to space
that he already occupied on the Level Two of the Crossroads
Mall.

The record in this case controverts the assertions of

Rasmussen on appeal.

But even if accepted as true, those

allegations do not meet the threshold requirements established
by this Court for the application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
The controlling authority in Utah makes it absolutely
clear that:
A mere promise to execute a written contract and
a subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to
create an estoppel, although reliance is placed

on such a promise and damage is sustained as a
consequence of the refusal. The acts and conduct
of the promissor must so clearly manifest an
intention that he will not assert the statute
that to permit him to do so would be to work a
fraud upon the other party.
McKinnon v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974).
In this case there is no allegation, nor any fact of record to
support an allegation that Crossroads ever manifested an
intention that it would abandon an existing right or that it
intented to waive the statute of frauds.

To the contrary, the

facts alleged by Rasmussen establish that if there was any
point on which all of the parties agreed, it was that unless
and until various written agreements were executed (some of
which did not even involve Crossroads), there was no agreement
at all.
Furthermore, the facts alleged by Rasmussen don't even
amount to a refusal to execute a written contract.

The most

that can be said is that Kravco, Inc. failed to deliver the
written lease forms as quickly as it had promised.

The only

parties that refused to execute the forms were Deseret Federal
and Rasmussen himself.

In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260

P.2d 570 (1953), the defendant promised to execute a written
conveyance of property and when informed that the plaintiff
intended to purchase adjacent property in reliance on the
defendant's promise, assured the plaintiff that he would sign
the conveyance.

The defendant later refused to sign the

conveyance after learning that the property he had promised to
convey was a "hot" property.

Id. at 260 P.2d 574.

The Court

found that this conduct was not sufficient to give rise to
promissory estoppel.

If the defendant in Ravarino was not

estopped from backing out of a promise to execute a written
conveyance, which was relied upon by the plaintiff, simply
because he believed he could get a better deal elsewhere,
clearly Crossroads cannot be estopped from asserting the
statute of frauds simply because its agent Kravco, Inc. failed
to deliver the lease agreement before the other parties,
Deseret Federal and Rasmussen, decided to change the deal.
Crossroads never refused and remained willing to execute the
documents implementing the original lease proposal.

If the

facts of this case do give rise to promissory estoppel, then
the statute of frauds is without meaning.
B.

There Are No Written Memoranda Subscribed By Crossroads Which Satisfy The
Statute Of Frauds.

Rasmussen contends that a letter from Bruce Barcal
(presumably the letter expressing Crossroads1 intent to release
Deseret Federal from its space) combined with the unsigned
lease form provided by Kravco, Inc., constitute sufficient
written memoranda of the alleged oral lease to satisfy the
statute of frauds.

In order to satisfy the statute of frauds

the signed writings must acknowledge that a contact has been

entered into.

Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412,

242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952).

The documents relied upon by

Rasmussen were neither signed by Crossroads, nor did they
indicate that a contract had been entered into.
Rasmussen knew and so testified that the lease
documents to be produced by Barcal remained subject to approval
by Crossroads:
Q. You understood that Mr. Barcal was the
negotiating lease agent and whatever documents
were generated would have to be approved by the
owner?
A..

That's correct.

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 26). The letter accompanying the lease
form confirmed Rasmussen1s understanding, stating that the
submission of the lease form did not "impose any obligation
upon either party until the execution of such document by the
Landlord. . . . "

R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 8). Rasmussen

had already entered into one lease with Crossroads and knew the
procedures to be followed.

Under such circumstances there is

no question but that Crossroads never executed any written
memoranda acknowledging that a contract had been entered into.
The documents relied upon by Rasmussen therefore fail, as a
matter of law, to satisfy the statute of frauds.
C.

None Of The Facts Alleged By Rasmussen
Constitute Part Performance Of The
Alleged Oral Lease Agreement.

Rasmussen contends that the statute of frauds is
satisfied by certain acts performed in reliance on the alleged

oral lease agreement.

As Deseret Federal points out, none of

the alleged acts of performance are exclusively referrable to
the actual performance of the alleged oral lease agreement and
therefore do not constitute part performance.
Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983).

See, Martin v.

The plans made, the bids

taken, and the expenses incurred in anticipation of remodeling
the Level One space were merely preparatory acts and were
equally consistent with Rasmussen's proposal to sublease from
Deseret Federal as with his proposal to lease the space from
Crossroads.

The SBA loan and the purchase of inventory were

also equally consistent with the continued operation of
Rasmussen1s shoe store on Level Two or, for that matter, a shoe
store anywhere in the city.
The payment of construction costs on the Level Two
lease is so directly related to that lease that under no
circumstances could it be said to be unequivocally related to
performance of the alleged Level One lease.

Furthermore,

Rasmussen1s own testimony and pleadings refute his present
contention that the payment constituted performance of the
Level One oral lease.

On appeal, Rasmussen contends that

Crossroads entered into the oral lease agreement in August of
1982 and that the agreement required the payment of
construction costs relating to the Level Two space.
Brief at 5.

Rasmussen

He claims that he paid those costs (amounting to

$2,400.00) between August of 1982 and January of 1983.

Id.

In

his Amended Complaint, however. Rasmussen asserts that
Crossroads agreed to the Level One lease after Deseret Federal
authorized Crossroads to conclude the transaction by its letter
of January 13, 1983.

R. 3.

By that date most if not all of

the construction costs had been paid.
Rasmussen1s sworn testimony further confirms that the
payment of the Level Two construction costs did not constitute
performance of the alleged Level One lease.

Rasmussen1s

affidavit of May 1, 1985 unequivocally states that Crossroads
required payment of construction costs on Level Two before it
would even negotiate a lease for additional space on Level One.
R. 239.

Rasmussen cannot create a genuine issue of material

fact by merely contradicting his own testimony.

Radobenko v.

Automated Equipment Corporation. 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir.
1975).

Moreover, even if Rasmussen's contradictory positions

could create a genuine question as to his reason for paying the
construction costs, the fact that such a question even exists
further establishes that the payments were not exclusively
referrable to performance of the alleged oral lease.
There is, therefore, no genuine issue of material fact
concerning the question of part performance.

Assuming that

Rasmussen did perform all of the acts that he relies on, none
of those acts meet the requirements of the doctrine of part
performance.

II.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary
Judgment On Crossroads1 Counterclaim For Rents
Due.

Five years after executing the lease; four and
one-half years after opening for business; 18 months after he
stopped paying rent; 12 months after being sued for breach of
his covenant to pay rent; and just two business days prior to
the hearing on Crossroad's motion for summary judgment,
Rasmussen asserted fraud as an affirmative defense to
enforcement of the lease agreement.

Although Rasmussen had

been previously deposed regarding the Level Two lease and had
acknowledged that he owed rent to Crossroads R. 175 (Rasmussen
Depo. 73-74), his last minute affidavit and answer to the
counterclaim asserted that he was not obligated to pay rent.
The district court properly refused to permit
Rasmussen to extend his 18 month rent-free operation of his
Level Two shoe store by raising a surprise claim of fraud for
the purpose of preventing summary judgment.

There were at

least three separate grounds, each of which was sufficient by
itself, to support District Judge Sawaya's determination that
"plaintiff's claimed defenses will not lie."
grounds are:

R. 244.

Those

(1) Rasmussen's failure to plead the affirmative

defense of fraud on a timely basis constituted a waiver of the
defense; (2) Rasmussen1s actions after learning of the fraud
also constituted a waiver; and (3) Rasmussen1s claim of fraud
was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

A.

Rasmussen Failed To Plead And
Therefore Waived The Affirmative
Defense Of Fraud.

Fraud is an affirmative defense that is waived unless
set forth in a required responsive pleading.
Civil Procedure. Rules 8(c), 12(h).

Utah Rules of

An affirmative defense to

a counterclaim must be served within 20 days after service of
the counterclaim.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(a).

Rasmussen did not answer Crossroads1 counterclaim until more
than 11 months had expired since the filing of the counterclaim
and more than one month had expired since the filing of the
motion for summary judgment.
In the absence of any reason or excuse (such as an
agreement with opposing counsel) such a complete disregard of
the pleading requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure must
be considered a failure to answer.

One who keeps his

affirmative defense secret for a year after becoming obligated
to assert it, and who conceals the defense even when questioned
whether he owed the rent required by the lease, must be deemed
to have waived the defense.

The district court's refusal to

permit the affirmative defense was the only fair and proper
decision and was clearly within the district court's discretion.
B.

Rasmussen Waived His Claim Of
Fraud By His Actions Subsequent To
Discovery Of The Alleged Fraud.

Rasmussen1s affidavit states that prior to execution
of the lease in May of 1980, he was told that Crossroads

planned to construct a walkway between the second levels of the
Crossroads and ZCMI malls.

R. 239-240, If 5.

He claims that

"following execution of the subject lease agreement" he learned
that the alleged representations were false. R. 240. If 8.

The

affidavit conspicuously and conveniently fails to specify
exactly when Rasmussen learned of the alleged fraud.
In the absence of any facts or allegations to the
contrary, it must be assumed that Rasmussen realized there
would be no walkway by the time the Crossroads Mall was
completed and held its grand opening in August, 1980.

Knowing

that the Crossroads Mall had been completed without the
walkway, Rasmussen proceeded to occupy his Level Two space and
began paying rent in November of 1980.

Rasmussen continued to

occupy the space until Crossroads1 motion for summary judgment
was granted in May of 1985.
Rasmussen1s acceptance of the leased space and
continued occupancy for nearly four and one-half years prevents
Rasmussen from asserting a fraud alleged to have occurred
several months before performance of the lease began.

This

Court has observed that such actions constitute a waiver of the
fraud claim:
We do not question the correctness of the
defendant's averments that where one has entered
into a contract where fraud may be involved, and
after having knowledge of those facts, continues
to perform or otherwise ratify the contract, he
is deemed to waive the claim of fraud. Nor that
one who claims to be defrauded must exercise
reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering

it and seeking a remedy therefore, or be
precluded from doing so.
Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901
(Utah 1976).

The record in this case creates no genuine issue

as to the fact that Rasmussen ratified the lease and failed to
exercise any prudence or diligence in seeking a remedy for the
alleged fraud.
This Court's decision in Duqan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1980) indicates a distinction between waiver of the right
to rescind a contract for fraud and waiver of the right to
recover damages.

The Court stated that:

[T]he defrauded party, who does not discover the
fraud until he has partly performed, may go
forward with the contract, keep what he has
received, and still maintain his action for
damages.
Id. at 1247 (emphasis added).

Although Rasmussen asserted both

the right to rescind and the right to affirm the lease, his
right to affirm and recover damages is not preserved by the
distinction recognized in Duqan v. Jones, supra.

That

distinction requires that the defrauded party begin to perform
before discovering the fraud.

Rasmussen has not even alleged

that the fraud was not discovered before he began to perform
the lease, and the facts of record indicate otherwise.

Having

failed to plead facts sufficient to support his affirmative
defense of fraud, the summary judgment on that claim was proper.

C.

Rasmussen1s Affirmative Defense Of
Fraud Was Barred By The Statute Of
Limitations.

Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-12-26(3) (1977)f
provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud must
be brought within three years of the accrual of the cause of
action.

Rasmussen does not deny that his claims for fraud

accrued more than three years prior to the date on which he
asserted fraud as a defense.

He only contends that the statute

of limitations cannot operate to bar an affirmative defense.
The law in Utah does not support Rasmussen1s claim.
Rasmussen cites Jacobsen v. Bunker. 699 P.2d 1208
(Utah 1985). for the proposition that fraud, as a defense or
counterclaim, is never barred by the statute of limitations.
Jacobsen. however, held only that where cross-demands
co-existed at some point in time, such cross-demands may be
asserted as set-offs against each other notwithstanding the
statute of limitations.

The case relied upon in Jacobsen makes

it clear that there must have been some point in time when both
cross-demands would have been timely in order to permit an
otherwise barred claim to be asserted as a set-off.

In Salt

Lake City v. Telluride Power Co.. 82 Utah 607. 17 P.2d 281
(1932). the Court clearly held that claims which became barred
by the statute of limitations prior to the accrual of the
opposing party's claim could not be asserted as defenses or
set-offs.

Id. at 285.

The obvious rationale for the limited "set-offs"
exception to the statute of limitations is that it would be
unfair to permit one party to benefit by waiting to assert his
claim until the opponent's claim becomes time-barred.

But

where, as in the Telluride Power case and in the present
action, the timely action did not accrue before the opposing
claim had ceased to exist, there is no purpose served by
reviving the dead claim.

In those circumstances there are no

policy considerations for excusing a party from sitting on his
rights.
The facts of record establish that Rasmussen1s claim
of fraud was barred before he stopped paying rent.

He alleges

that the misrepresentations were made prior to May of 1980.
239-240.

R.

Crossroads1 counterclaim was for unpaid rents

beginning with the month of November, 1983.

R. 226.

Thus

Crossroads1 claim arose three years and six months after the
alleged misrepresentations were made.

Even assuming that

Rasmussen did not discover the alleged fraud until the Mall was
completed and he saw that there was no walkway, his claim would
have been barred in August of 1983, still four months prior to
the accrual of Crossroads1 first claim for rent.
There are no facts or allegations in the record to
even suggest that the statute should be tolled beyond August of
1980.

Furthermore, the burden of pleading and proving that the

statute should be tolled was upon Rasmussen.

See, Clawson v.

Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72 Utah 137, 269 P. 147
(1928).

In the absence of factual allegations that Rasmussen

did not discover the fraud until after November of 1980, the
Court is compelled to conclude that that statute of limitations
began to run before that date.

See, Valley Bank of Nevada v.

Foster & Marshall, Inc., 585 F.Supp 1351, 1353 (D. Utah 1984).
Because Rasmussen failed to plead any facts to establish that
his claim for fraud did not become time-barred before any of
Crossroads1 claims for rent accrued, Rasmussen1s affirmative
defense of fraud was absolutely barred by the statute of
limitations.
CONCLUSION
The orders of the district court granting Crossroad's
motions for summary judgment were proper.
The facts of record, viewed in the light most
favorable to Rasmussen. provide no basis for preventing the
application of the statute of frauds to the alleged oral lease
agreement.

None of the facts alleged by Rasmussen give rise to

a promissory estoppel.

None of the documents of record

constitute sufficient written memoranda of the alleged
agreement, and none of Rasmussen1s acts constitute part
performance.

Summary judgment was therefore proper.

Summary judgment was also proper on Crossroad's
counterclaim.

It was well within the discretion of the

district court to reject Rasmussen1s untimely attempt to raise

the affirmative defense of fraud.

Furthermore, Rasmussen's

ratification of the lease, as well as his concealing of his
claim during discovery, constituted a waiver of the claim.
Rasmussen's belated claim is also barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.
For all of th above reasons, defendant Crossroads
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary
judgments entered in favor of Crossroads and to dismiss
plaintiff's appeals.
Dated this 25th day of November, 1985.
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